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Abstract
In the domain of Web Services, it is not uncommon to ﬁnd redundant services
that provide functionalities to the clients. Services with the same functionality
can be clustered into a group of redundant services. Respectively, if a service
oﬀers diﬀerent functionalities, it belongs to more than one group. Having various
Web Services that are able to handle the client’s request suggests the necessity of
a mechanism that selects the most appropriate Web Service at a given moment of
time. This thesis presents an approach, Repository Based Web Services Selection,
for dynamic service selection based on virtualization on the server side. It helps
managing redundant services in a transparent manner as well as allows adding
services to the system at run-time. In addition, the model assures a level of
security since the consumers do not have direct access to the Web Services.
This work describes diﬀerent security aspects of Web Services and technologies
they use and a framework to introduce a message level security to SOAP (Simple
Object Access Protocol). The purpose of the session protocol is explained along
with the approach to authenticate two Web Services with each other and how to
establish a shared secret session key with which they can encrypt their messages
to ensure conﬁdentiality. Various security issues that became relevant during the
design of the system and at the time of setting up the SOAP session are being
addressed in this work. The analysis of the session setup process proves that an
adversary cannot break the protocol by interception, alteration or by resending of
messages.
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Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Web Services is an integrated solution for realizing the vision of the
next generation of the Web
Web Service is a software component invoked over the Web via an XML [1]
message that follows the SOAP [2] Simple Object Access Protocol: is a sim-
ple XML based protocol to let applications exchange information over HTTP to
transport it using open protocols) standard and also it is a communication pro-
tocol. Web Services are based on distributed technology and provide standard
means of interoperating between diﬀerent software applications across and within
organizational boundaries with the use of XML. The basic Web Service platform
is combination of HTTP and XML. The HTTP protocol is the most used Internet
protocol. XML provides a language which can be used between diﬀerent platforms
and programming languages.
Each SOAP message is presented as an envelope with two sections - a header
and a body. The header contains information about the message itself, and the
body consists of data that has to be transferred to the recipient. These standards
make the Web Services independent of any programming language, hardware and
software platform.
Web services use XML to code and to decode data, and SOAP. Web Services
are web applications whose interfaces are exposed over protocols like HTML and
XML [3] .Web Services are described by Web Service Deﬁnition Language (WSDL)
in XML format. WSDL [1] is a major language that provides a model and an
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XML format to describe the syntax about Web services. It acts as a vocabulary,
associated with UDDI.
Figure 1.1: Web Service Structure
1.1.1 Web Services Selection Process
The Web Service description hides the implementation details, but at the same
time, gives enough information that is necessary for the service interaction Figure
1.2 shows the web service design paradigm.
SOAP, UDDI and WSDL are used in diﬀerent phases, called publishing, ﬁnd-
ing, and binding, in the Web Services development cycle. The Web Service Design
paradigm is shown in Figure 1.2.The model begins with the publish phase, when
an organization decides to oﬀer a Web Service (1). The Web Service can be an
existing application with a new Web Service front end, or it can be a totally new
application. Once an enterprise has developed the application and made it avail-
able as a Web Service, the enterprise describes the interface to the application so
that potential users interested in subscribing to it can understand how to access
it. This description can be oral, in some human language such as English, or it
3
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Figure 1.2: Web Service Design Paradigm
can be in a form, such as WSDL, that can be understood by Web Services devel-
opment tools. To facilitate automated lookups, the service provider advertises the
existence of the service by publishing it in a registry (2).
The next step of the model is the ﬁnd phase. Once the service is advertised
in a UDDI registry, potential subscribers can search for possible providers (3 and
4) and implement applications that utilize the service (5). Potential subscribers
use the entries in the registry to learn about the company oﬀering the service, the
service being oﬀered, and the interface to the service. The ﬁnal phase of the model
is the bind phase. When a subscriber decides to use a published service, it must
implement the service interface, also called binding to the service, and negotiate
with the service provider for the use of the service. When the application has been
implemented and the business relationships resolved, the Web Service is utilized
operationally. The only participants at this point are the service subscriber, who
requests the service (6), and the service provider, who delivers the service (7).
WSDL and UDDI [4] registries are generally only used during the initial discovery
of the service and the design of the application.
Web Services can encapsulate a speciﬁc task or can be designed as a compo-
sition of other services, representing a complex aggregation. The Web Services
conceptual model describes the process of discovery, request and response, as in
4
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ﬁgure1.3.Discovery is the process of ﬁnding the service that provides the function-
ality that is required. A request provides the input to the service. The response
yields the output from the service. Service providers describe their Web Services
and advertise them in a universal registry called UDDI. This enables service re-
questors to search the registry and ﬁnd services. UDDI allows for the creation of
registries that are accessible over the web.
Figure 1.3: Web Service Invocation
IBM, Microsoft, and Oracle all have public UDDI servers running for commer-
cial purposes. There are also many organizations developing third party servers
for users to establish their private UDDI servers. The UDDI client oﬀers two
approaches to access the UDDI server: either through a standalone application
providing an easy-to-use interface for developers; or through a software library
working with the WS consumer or provider [5]. UDDI Browser is an open-source
UDDI client following the ﬁrst approach. A developer can use the application to
browse, search, and even change information in the UDDI server. The WS con-
sumer sends a SOAP request to the WS provider through an HTTP connection.
The provider processes the request and returns a SOAP message as the reply to
the consumer. Then, the provider closes the HTTP connection to ﬁnalize the
invocation.
1.1.2 State of the art review
This section introduces Web service technologies and explains how to invoke, pub-
lish and provide Web services in a distributed environment. Section 2.7 also gives a
5
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short overview of trust-related projects and their signiﬁcance for the development
of behavior aware computer systems.
• The Notion of the Web Service
In [3] the deﬁnition of a Web service is given as: ”any process that can be
integrated into external systems through valid XML documents over Internet
protocols”. This deﬁnition outlines the general idea Web services are built for
Unlike services in general, Web services are based on speciﬁcations for data
transfer, method invocation and publishing. This is often misunderstood
and when a Web service is mentioned it sometimes refers to a general service
provided on the Web, like the weather forecast on a Web page for example.
The weather forecast is a service and provides its functionality for a variety
of users but unless it comprises an interface to communicate with other
applications via SOAP, it is not a Web service by deﬁnition. Web services
can be seen as software components with an interface to communicate with
other software components. They have certain functionality that is available
through a special kind of Remote Procedure Call. In fact they even evolved
from traditional Remote Procedure Calls. The diﬀerence lies in the interface
and the method for transportation. Furthermore Web services cannot be
viewed or used with an ordinary browser. They require a uniﬁed form of
messaging embedded in a XML document. This communication architecture
contains three subcomponents.
– Consumer: This denotes the entity utilizing the Web service. This is
another application in most cases.
– Transport: It deﬁnes the means for the communication the Consumer
uses while interacting with a service.
– Provider: The service provider.
In order to keep the whole system truly platform-independent, transport in
both direction uses XML. This includes the description of an operation to
6
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execute and the data payload as well. Although transportation is not re-
stricted to a speciﬁc protocol or method, HTTP became the most popular
way to pass on XML documents between Web services. The following sec-
tion will start with the ﬁrst step in our course to understand Web services:
Transportation.
• HTTP
Found everywhere on the Internet, HTTP (Hyper Text Transfer Protocol)
is a ubiquitous protocol for data connections between Web browsers and
servers. This protocol is the current standard for transferring HTML doc-
uments, although it is designed to be extensible to almost any document
format like XML for example. HTTP Version 1.1 is documented in RFC
2068 [6]. It operates over TCP connections, usually to port 80, though any
other port can be used. After a successful connection, the client transmits
a request message to the server, which sends a reply message back. The
simplest HTTP message is ”GET url”, to which the server replies by send-
ing the named document. If the document doesn’t exist, the server may
send an HTML-encoded message stating this. This form of communication
represents a typical request/response mechanism. A client sends a request
for a speciﬁc document to the server and waits for a response. If the server
does not respond with the requested document it is up to the client to wait
for the timeout and request the same document again. This loosely coupled
type of communication is very common in client-server architectures.
In addition to GET requests, clients can also send HEAD and POST re-
quests, of which POSTs are the most important. POSTs are used for HTML
forms and other operations that require the client to transmit a block of data
to the server. After sending the header and the blank line, the client trans-
mits the data. This way Web services utilize the HTTP protocol to transmit
both Data payload and service request to a Web service. Now it is time to
explain how the transmitted data looks like.
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• XML
XML is an abbreviation for Extensible Markup Language [6] .It is designed
to describe data and improve the functionality of the Web by providing
more ﬂexible and adaptable ways of information representation. It is called
extensible because its format is not ﬁxed like HTML. Instead, XML is a meta
language which lets you design your own customized markup languages. A
markup is a mechanism to specify structures within a document, whereas
the way to add markup to a document is deﬁned by the XML speciﬁcation.
But unlike HTML, XML does not specify semantics or a set of tags. There
is no prescribed method for rendering XML documents, so semantics will be
deﬁned by the application using it or by style sheets. The following example
will show the structure of an XML document and how data is represented:
Figure 1.4: XML Document and Data Representation
This basic XML document starts with the XML declaration in the ﬁrst line.
It deﬁnes the XML version and the used character encoding. In this case
the document conforms to the 1.0 speciﬁcation of XML and uses the ISO-
8859-1 (Latin-1/West European) character set. It is important to specify
the character set to avoid misinterpretation of the provided data.
The next line describes the root element of the document. Elements are
one way to store data in an XML document. The following 4 lines describe
8
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the child elements of root (to, from, heading and body). By looking at the
elements it is easy to see that the XML document represents a message. The
last line ﬁnally describes the end of the root element, completing the note
from Al to Bob. Along with the root element in the second line comes an
attribute called noteID. Attributes are another way to store data and used
to provide additional information about elements, also called meta-data. In
this case it may be used to count the messages sent from Al to Bob. A list
of legal elements that deﬁnes the document structure is the Document Type
Deﬁnition (DTD). A document with correct XML syntax is called ”Well
Formed” while a ”Valid” XML document also conforms to a DTD. More
and more applications make use of XML to store information because of its
beneﬁts. Some of them are:
– The structure is well-deﬁned and can be passed between diﬀerent com-
puter systems which would otherwise be unable to communicate.
– Data payload is encapsulated in tags and therefore readable by human
viewers.
– Due to their textual nature, XML-Files are platform-independent.
These advantages made XML the perfect format to communicate between
Web services. To ensure a platform and language independent use for every
Web service, SOAP was developed. It is an XML application with deﬁned
elements and a redeﬁned structure. The following section will treat SOAP
in detail.
• SOAP
SOAP, the Simple Object Access Protocol was developed to enable a commu-
nication between Web services. It was designed as a lightweight protocol for
exchange of information in a decentralized, distributed environment. SOAP
is an extensible, text-based framework for enabling communication between
diverse parties that have no prior knowledge of each other. This is the re-
quirement a transport protocol for Web services has to fulﬁll. SOAP speciﬁes
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a mechanism to perform remote procedure calls and therefore removes the
requirement that two systems must run on the same platform or be written
in the same programming language. SOAP also deﬁnes data encoding rules,
called base level encodings or Section 5 encodings. It is important to note
that these Section 5 encodings are not mandatory in any way, so clients and
servers are free to use diﬀerent conventions for encoding data as long as they
agree on format. All this is done in the context of a standardized message
format. The primary part of this message has a MIME type of text/xml and
contains the SOAP envelope which is an XML document.
The envelope consists of a an optional header which may target the nodes
that perform intermediate processing, and a mandatory body which is in-
tended for the ﬁnal recipient of the message. This way a ﬁrewall can be
adjusted to ﬁlter SOAP Messages with an inappropriate header for exam-
ple. The Header may also hold digital signatures for a request contained in
the body. The body contains the serialized payload. For a request this is
the method argument where the surrounding XML tag must have the same
name as the called method. The response body contains the return value if
it exists. Data types are not delineated in the SOAP envelope explicitly so
the type of a result parameter cannot be discovered just by looking at the
SOAP message.The anatomy of a SOAP Envelope is shown in ﬁg 1.5.
In this example, the header contains some additional information enclosed
by the Transaction-ID tag. This ID can be processed by any node before the
ﬁnal service node to ensure the request’s correctness for example. The body
contains but one method call in the request. The called method’s name is
RemoteFunction whereas the methods parameter Parameter1 is 123.
The parameters type may be of integer type but could be a String as well.
The client application must decide how to handle it. SOAP messages are
fundamentally one-way transmissions from a sender to a receiver, but they
are often combined to implement a request/response mechanism. Summing
up, SOAP is an XML-based protocol for sending messages and making re-
10
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Figure 1.5: Anatomy of SOAP Envelope
mote procedure calls in a distributed environment. Using SOAP, data can
be serialized without regard to any transport protocol, although HTTP is
typically the protocol of choice.
1.1.3 Publishing and Finding Web Services
With SOAP, a communication between Web services is possible and structured and
each participant knows how to send or receive the corresponding SOAP Message.
The ﬁnal step to complete the communication architecture of Web services is to
deﬁne how to access a service once it is implemented. This is where the Web
Service Description Language (WSDL, [4]) steps in. WSDL describes services
as collections of network endpoints, or ports. Again it is an XML document
with a deﬁned grammar where the abstract deﬁnition of endpoints and messages
is separated from their concrete network deployment or data format bindings.
WSDL documents use the following elements to describe a Web service:
11
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• Types: A container for data type deﬁnitions
• Message: A deﬁnition of the data being passed in a single RPC.
• Operation: A description of an action (method) supported by the service.
• Port Type:A set of operations supported by one or more endpoints.
• Binding: A concrete data format speciﬁcation for a particular port type.
• Port: A single endpoint deﬁned as a combination of a binding and the
network address where it can be found.
• Service: A collection of related endpoints.
Now that a Web service can be described completely, the only remaining problem
is how a potential user can ﬁnd the corresponding description (WSDL document).
The following section deals with this last problem.
1.1.4 Using Web Services
To ﬁnally use a Web service, several steps have to be performed. Figure 1.6 shows
the order of the events, followed by a description of how to execute each step.
1. Locating the Web service: This can either be done by browsing a public
UDDI registry or by means of an existing WSDL document. It is possible
to build a private UDDI registry as well. Private registries are easier to
maintain due to their size but it can be hard to discover the UDDI reg-
istry’s position. Sometimes, a company’s main Web page is linked to WSDL
documents, too.
2. Creating the SOAP Message: This is done by the development tool
in most cases. Tools like Weblogic Workshop from BEA or Web service
Development Kit from Microsoft will create valid SOAP messages for the
methods described in the WSDL document or UDDI registry.
12
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Figure 1.6: Invoking a Web Service
3. Transmission: Another advantage of message transport via HTTP is the
service providers ﬁrewall setting. If the ﬁrewall permits Port 80 (HTTP
POST/GET) connections, a SOAP message is able to pass through as well.
If the ﬁrewall is unable to ﬁlter and process SOAP requests on the other
hand, it leaves the system vulnerable to attackers who use the Web service’s
functionality for a potential attack.
4. Parsing the SOAP message : This is done by the provider’s Application
Server. The parser decides if the request is valid and decides which procedure
13
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to call.
5. Processing: The service provider calls all necessary procedures, or even
other Web services, to complete the requested task.
6. Return the result: The result is wrapped in a SOAP reply and returned
to the requestor where the client application can parse the message and
evaluate the included data.
1.2 Web Services Security
The security requirements of Web Services are similar to that of any other In-
ternet based application. This report mainly deals with issues in providing basic
security services, authentication, authorization, conﬁdentiality, integrity and non-
repudiation, to Web Services. Web Services enable the exchange of data and
the remote invocation of application logic using XML messaging to move data
through ﬁrewalls and between heterogeneous systems, after all the primary pur-
pose of the Web Services is to enable many diﬀerent applications to share data
across a heterogeneous environment. Web Services are expressly targeted at dis-
tributed applications that cross-corporate boundaries, and consequently are likely
to have challenging security requirements.
• Authentication
To maintain a secure Web Service you need to know the identities of the
parties who are establishing a Web Service connection. Authentication is
a security requirement that ensures each entity involved in the usage of a
Web Service- the requestor, the provider, and the broker (if there is one) are
who they actually claim to be. Authentication is usually implemented using
passwords, digital signatures etc. These authentication techniques work well
for point-to-point authentication like client-server architecture. Web Service
request and response need to go through many intermediaries before the
14
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request is processed. The design of Web Services requires support for end-
to-end authentication. SSL does not support end-to-end authentication of
chains of entities moreover SSL works at the Transport Layer to authenticate
the incoming requests whereas Web Services require authentication at the
Application layer. Let us consider the following example as shown in Figure
1, where a browser sends a request to the web site which forwards to a web
service. The identity of the initiator or the sender which is the browser
is not known to the web service as it sees only the web site which is an
intermediary.
• Confidentiality
Conﬁdentiality in Web Services can be either Session-level or end-to-end.
Session-level conﬁdentiality ensures the consumer and provider that their
communications cannot be overheard but Web service application topolo-
gies include all sorts of devices, PCs, proxies, demilitarized zones, gateways
etc. Consequently, many intermediaries come between two communicating
parties. SSL/TLS may secure the path between any two, but not from one
end to the other.
SSL can provide conﬁdentiality between client and the website and between
website and web service, but not between client and Web Service. The user
credentials are encrypted and sent from browser to website in a secured
channel. The web server then needs to decrypt the message and re-encrypt
and send it to the web service. During this gap, the information could be
inspected or modiﬁed. End to end conﬁdentiality cannot be achieved using
SSL. XML encryption facilitates encryption of SOAP message in part or as
a whole to ensure end-to-end conﬁdentiality. This technique is discussed in
detail in next section.
• Integrity
Integrity is the assurance that information can only be modiﬁed by autho-
15
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rized entities. Integrity can be achieved using hash functions and Message
Authentication Codes (MAC). Session-level integrity can be provided by SSL
whereas Web Services need end-to-end integrity. SSL may ensure integrity
between any two points in the web service application topology but not from
one end to the other. This is because at each intermediary point there is
a possibility of message getting modiﬁed. End-to-end integrity can be pro-
vided using digital signatures. A digital signature is an application of XML
signature, which is developed by W3C/IEFT XML Signature working group.
• Non-Repudiation
Non-repudiation provides the capability to prove to a third party that a par-
ticular transaction occurred. Presently SSL is the most widely used protocol
that provides non-repudiation in client-server architecture. Since Web Ser-
vices involves passing of messages over a chain of entities where each entity
both decrypts and re-encrypts the message using a protocol like SSL can
provide non-repudiation between any two entities but not over the chain.
XML encryption, XML Signature, and SAML are new technologies address-
ing this requirement. A detailed description of these technologies is provided
later.
1.3 Problem Definition
Web Service Selection: The purpose of web service selection is to select optimal
web service for a particular task.
When dynamic discovery is used in Web Services, it is common that the result
of the discovery contains more than one provider. Unlike the ﬁle sharing P2P
system in which a ﬁle download can be split into many small tasks running in
multiple peers, a service invocation occurs between a provider and a consumer.
As shown in Figure 1.7, the WS consumer must pick only one from all candidate
providers to perform the invocation. Even for a composite Web Service consisting
of many atomic Web Services, the selection issue still needs to be addressed when
there are multiple providers available for an atomic service.
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Figure 1.7: Client to select from Similar Services
In order to make a distinction between the services which provide the same
functionality, selection criteria should be used. They help evaluate the Web Ser-
vices within a group and choose the component that matches the needs and
the preferences of the consumers, while taking into account the abilities of the
providers.
Web Services can be ranked by the Quality of Service (QoS) they oﬀer. QoS is
a means to enable selection and ﬁlter out unqualiﬁed providers. QoS can be seen as
an aggregated measure of generic criteria such as availability, reliability , failure
rate, trust and reputation, response time, price, and network load and domain
speciﬁc features .The reasoning mechanism is responsible for the selection of a
Web Service at a particular moment of time. In order to distinguish one service
from another using the speciﬁed criteria, this unit requires a set of instructions that
help evaluate each component and choose the most appropriate one respectively.
A set of instructions can be seen as a selection technique.XML Web services enable
the exchange of data and the remote invocation of application logic using XML
messaging to move data through ﬁrewalls and between heterogeneous systems.
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Figure 1.8: Redundant Web Services
Although remote access of data and application logic is not a new concept, but
doing so in a loosely coupled fashion is. Hence it poses new challenges. In Web
Services, the interface hides the implementation details of the service, allowing it
to be used independently of the hardware and software platform on which it is
implemented and also of the programming language in which it is written. This
allows and encourages Web Services based applications to be loosely coupled,
component oriented, cross technology implementations.
Security is the single biggest concern to deploy Web Services, SSL provides
good point to point security, but fails to provide end - to - end security, which is
needed to provide security for the transaction in the Web Services. The purpose of
this work is to develop an approach for dynamic and transparent service selection
and to evaluate the proposed architecture in terms of what selection techniques
should be applied.
This work also aims at describing the concerns related to Web Service security
and analyzing a few tools and techniques, which could be used to secure Web Ser-
vices. The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 is an overview
of the literature survey. Chapter 3 is the proposed approach and the evaluation
of the model is discussed. The comparison between the various technologies and
protocols, which could be used to address security concerns of Web Services are
presented in chapter 4 and the implementation of encryption of SOAP messages
are also discussed in chapter 4. Chapter 5 presents the conclusions of the thesis
and some potential future directions.
18
Literature Survey
Introduction
Web Services Security Protocols
Signature creation and verification process
Conclusion
Chapter 2
Literature Survey
2.1 Introduction
Researchers have proposed various approaches for dynamic web service selection.
Maximilien and Singh [7] propose a multi-agent based architecture to select the
best service according to the consumers’ preferences. Maximilien and Singh de-
scribe a system in which proxy agents gather information on services, and also
interact with other proxy agents to maximize their information and the concep-
tual model they use to interact with the services is detailed elsewhere [8]. The
proxy agents lie between the service consumer and the service providers. The
agents contact a service broker, which contains information about all known ser-
vices, as well as ratings about its observed QoS. From there, the information is
combined with its own historical usage, and the combined knowledge is used to
select a service, though the authors do not detail how. The agencies contain data
about the interactions between the clients and the services which is used during
the Web Services selection process.
In his work, trust and reputation are taken into account during the decision
process. Their approach divide the QoS attributes into objective and subjective.
The former include QoS features such as availability, reliability, and response
time. Their approach is shown in ﬁgure 2.1. Liu, Ngu, and Zeng [9] consider
these features in their proposed approach as well but their major selection criteria
is based on the QoS based service selection. They have considered three quality
criteria namely execution time, execution duration and reputation for the selection.
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In addition, execution price, duration, transactions support, compensation and
penalty rate are the other criteria. The authors of [9] suggest an open, fair, and
dynamic framework that evaluates the QoS of the available Web Services by using
clients’ feedback and monitoring.
Figure 2.1: Model proposed by Liu, Ngu, and Zeng
Figure 2.2: Model proposed by Maximilien and Singh
The reasoning mechanism is responsible for the selection of a Web Service at a
particular moment of time. In order to distinguish one service from another using
the speciﬁed criteria, this unit requires a set of instructions that help evaluate each
component and choose the most appropriate one respectively. A set of instruc-
tions can be seen as a selection technique. The major components of a reasoning
mechanism are criteria, model, and selection technique. The model collects infor-
mation about the participants of the client-server interaction as well as represents
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Table 2.1: Comparison of Approaches for Web Service Selection.
it as aggregated measures. Diﬀerent selection techniques can implement various
business logics in order to make a decision.
The reasoning mechanism in the approach proposed by Liu, Ngu, and Zeng
[9] computes the QoS of the Web Services, ranks them, and selects the most
appropriate one. To perform the selection, the QoS registry in their system takes
in data collected from the clients, stores it in a matrix of web service data in which
each row represents a web service and each column a QoS parameter [10] , and then
performs a number of computations on the data, such as normalization. Clients
can then access the registry, and are given a service based on the parameters
that the client prefers. The bottleneck of the approach is the dependency on
the consumers to give regular feedback about their past experience with the Web
Services. An overview of their approach is shown in ﬁgure 2.2.The Success of
this model is based on the clients or the end users and their will to provide the
necessary feedback on QoS.
2.2 Web Services Security Protocols
• XML Encryption
Encryption provides conﬁdentiality. It does this by preventing the data from
being understood except by the intended recipient. The XML Encryption
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Syntax and processing standard deﬁnes a process for encrypting digital data
and how the resulting encrypted data should be represented in XML. The
smallest unit of information that can be encrypted is an element [11].
– To encrypt XML elements:
1. Select the encryption algorithm and parameters.
2. Obtain the key. If the key is going to be identiﬁed, construct
a KeyInfo element. Encrypt the key, if it will be sent with the
encrypted data, and construct an EncryptedKey element. Place it
in KeyInfo or in some other portion of the document.
3. Encrypt the data. For XML data, this can involve a transformation
to UTF-8 encoding and serialization. The result is an octet string.
4. Build the EncryptedType structure. Where the encrypted data is
actually stored in the structure, instead of being referenced, the
encrypted data must be base64 encoded.
5. Replace the unencrypted element in the XML document with the
EncryptedType structure .
– To decrypt XML elements:
1. Process the element. Unspeciﬁed parameters must be supplied by
the application.
2. Obtain the decryption key. This may require using a private key to
decrypt a symmetric key or to retrieve the key from a local store.
3. Decrypt the data in CipherData.
4. Process the decrypted data. This requires that the application re-
store the decrypted data, which is in UTF-8, to its original form. It
must be able to replace the CipherData structure in the XML doc-
ument with the results of the decryption. In some cases, additional
processing is required.
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– Issues
The primary issues with using XML Encryption for Web Services are:
Out-of-band agreements between the sender and the receiver:
XML Encryption is very ﬂexible and allows many parameters to be
omitted from the CipherData structure. For instance, KeyInfo is op-
tional. For the most part, we consider this ﬂexibility a positive feature.
If the data is decrypted immediately and does not have to persist, this
is not a problem. However, if the encrypted data must be stored to
protect conﬁdentiality or if signatures have been applied to encrypted
data and it is important to preserve a record of the signatures, leav-
ing information out of the structure can lead to decryption problems
at a later time. In general, including the encryption parameters in the
structure is preferable. Choice of algorithms and key lengths:XML
Encryption does not mandate the use of particular algorithms or key
lengths. It is the user’s responsibility to ensure that the right choices
are made. The system implementer should carefully consider how long
the encrypted data must be retained, how much use the keys will have,
and the preferred algorithm, and then decide on the appropriate key
length. Application in SOAP: XML Encryption speciﬁes encryption
for XML documents. It does not describe how XML Encryption data
and structures are implemented within the SOAP message structure.
• XML Signature
The XML Signature recommendation [11] deﬁnes how digital data is signed
and how the resulting signature should be represented in XML. While the
data to be signed is intended to be more general than XML, XML data is
the principal application for XML Signature. With XML Signature, all or
selected portions of an XML document can be signed.
The recommendation deﬁnes the process for creating and representing an
XML signature and then verifying the signature. It relies on existing algo-
rithms for the signature, message digests, and message authentication codes.
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It oﬀers several established alternatives for certiﬁcates, including X.509. It
can also be used without certiﬁcates. This represents a departure from es-
tablished thinking about public key cryptosystems, but it can be justiﬁed
under certain circumstances. The recommendation references other stan-
dards for transformation such as canonicalization, rendering the data in a
standard way that eliminates inconsequential diﬀerences in representation,
and encoding/ decoding.
Digital signatures are much more complex to implement than encryption.
Because signatures are tied to the representation of the data being signed,
caution must be exercised to ensure that the representation of the signed
data and the veriﬁed data are consistent. Signature processing is much
more subtle than encryption and is very sensitive to changes in data repre-
sentation and processing order. Even if the signature was valid at the time
it was created, it may not be veriﬁable because of changes that occurred as
the message was routed.
Format/Structure An XML signature consists of two required elements,
SignedInfo and SignatureValue. There are also two optional elements, Key-
Info and Object. SignedInfo. This includes the CanonicalizationMethod,
which is discussed in the next section, for the SignedInfo element itself, the
algorithms (usually a digest algorithm and a signature algorithm) used to
produce the signature, and one or more references to the data being signed.
Each Reference element includes a URI identifying the data being signed,
the transforms that process the data (we will describe some transforms in
the next section), an identiﬁer of the digest algorithm used with the refer-
enced data, and the value of the message digest.
SignatureValue: This is the value of the digital signature. It is base64
encoded.
KeyInfo: This provides the information needed by the receiving applica-
tion to validate the signature. If it is omitted, the receiving application is
expected to know how to validate the signature. For instance, two business
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partners may have previously exchanged public keys through some other
means, thereby eliminating the need to include the public key as a child
element of KeyInfo. If this hasn’t been done, KeyInfo can contain a key
identiﬁer, the signer’s public key, a reference to where the public key is
available, or the signer’s public key certiﬁcate. Several public key certiﬁcate
formats are supported.
Object: This is a structure that carries any other information needed to
support the signature.
• WS Security Tokens
The WS-Security speciﬁcation speciﬁes an abstract message security model
in terms of security tokens [12] combined with digital signatures as proof of
possession of the security token referred to as a key. Security tokens assert
claims, and signatures provide a mechanism for authenticating the sender’s
knowledge of the key. This signature can also be used to bind with the claims
in the security token. This assumes that the token is trusted. It may be
interesting to note that we do not specify a particular method for authenti-
cation. The speciﬁcation only indicates that security tokens may be bound
to messages. This is where the power and extensibility of WS-Security lies.
• HTTP Authentication
HTTP basic authentication is orthogonal to the security support provided by
WS-Security or HTTP Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) conﬁguration. A simple
way to provide authentication data for the service client is to authenticate
to the protected service endpoint using HTTP basic authentication. The
basic authentication is encoded in the HTTP request that carries the SOAP
message. When the application server receives the HTTP request, the user
name and password are retrieved and veriﬁed using the authentication mech-
anism speciﬁc to the server. Although the basic authentication data is send
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over HTTP, which is recommended. The integrity and conﬁdentiality of the
data can be protected by the SSL protocol.
2.3 Signature Creation/Verification Process
To create a digital signature:
1. Apply the transform or transforms to the data object to be signed. Trans-
forms are applied in the order they are speciﬁed.
2. Calculate the message digest of the output of the transforms.
3. Create a reference element that includes the URI of the data object (op-
tional),the transforms used, the digest algorithm, and the digest value. As
many reference elements as needed may be created. This occurs if one sig-
nature covers several nodes of the document.
4. Create the SignedInfo element. Include the SignatureMethod, the Canonicalization-
Method, and the references previously generated.
5. Apply this method to SignedInfo.
6. Use the algorithms speciﬁed by SignatureMethod to create the signature.
This usually means applying a message digest algorithm to the canonicalized
SignedInfo and then signing the resulting digest.
7. Create the Signature element that contains the SignedInfo, the SignatureValue,KeyInfo
(if needed), and Object (if needed).
8. Note that a diﬀerent canonicalization algorithm or message digest algorithm
can be applied to each referenced element.
To verify a signature:
1. Process the SignedInfo element according to the SignatureMethod speciﬁed
in SignedInfo.
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2. For each reference element, obtain the data object referenced.
3. Process each data object according to the speciﬁed transforms.
4. Digest the result according to the digest algorithm speciﬁed for the refer-
enced element. Compare the result with the value stored in the correspond-
ing reference element. If the two are not equal, the veriﬁcation fails.
5. Obtain the necessary keying information. It may be available in KeyInfo, or
it may have been preplaced.
6. Apply the signature method using the previously obtained key to conﬁrm
the SignatureValue over the canonicalized SignedInfo element.
Issues: There are several topics for consideration when implementing a digital
signature system for Web Services.
Signature syntax vs. semantics: The XML Signature Recommendation
deals with the syntax and technical process for creating an XML digital signature.
Signatures have a meaning from a legal and business point of view. It is important
to consider what need the signature meets and then ensure that the signature is
being applied to the appropriate parts of the document to satisfy the need.
Out-of-band agreements between the signer and the verifier: The
XML Signature Recommendation is very ﬂexible and allows many parameters to
be omitted from the signature. For instance, KeyInfo is optional. For the most
part, we consider this ﬂexibility a positive feature. However, leaving information
out of the signature means that there can be problems with signature veriﬁcation
at a later time or if the veriﬁer changes. In general, including signature parameters
in the signature element is preferable.
Choice of algorithms and key lengths: XML Signature does not mandate
the use of particular algorithms or key lengths. It is the user’s responsibility to
ensure that the right choices are made. The system implementer should carefully
consider how long the signature must be retained and the preferred algorithm,
and then decide on the appropriate key length.
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Table 2.2: Threats addressed by Web Services Standards
Application in SOAP: XML Signature speciﬁes encryption for XML docu-
ments. It does not describe how XML Signature data and structures are imple-
mented within the SOAP message structure.
Comparison: The table 2.2 shows the comparison of various Web Services
Security protocols with respect to various threats addressed by Web Services stan-
dards.
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have seen the approaches for Web Services Selection and made
a comparison between the existing models. We have also seen the various cryp-
tographic techniques used to protect XML and SOAP messages. We have also
viewed the process of encrypting and decrypting XML documents and how to sign
and verify signatures on XML data. We also went over supporting techniques
such as XPath, and Canonicalization, and security-related issues that must be
addressed when using these techniques.
We have also seen the various Web Services security protocols and their ap-
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plications in SOAP. We have addressed to issues like key length of the message
and Out-of-band agreements between the signer and the veriﬁer. Along with these
the signing and verifying process has been discussed A comparison between the
various Web Services Security protocols with respect to various threats addressed
by Web Services standards.
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Proposed Approach: Web
Services Selection
3.1 Introduction
In the domain of Web Services, it is not uncommon to ﬁnd redundant services
that provide functionalities to the clients. According to the Web Services con-
ceptual model (discussed in chapter 1), the client receives a list of services from
the UDDI, selects one, and starts an interaction with the service to process the
request .As seen in chapter 2, service selection is an important process and various
techniques have been proposed. In this chapter, another approach for dynamic
service selection and invocation is introduced, which has the following advantages
in comparison with previous approaches:
• It provides location and replication transparency of the Web Services;
• It hides the system’s complexity from the clients;
• It provides a transparent service selection from the client’s point of view;
• It assures a level of security, since the clients do not have direct access to
the Web Services.
The development of the proposed model in a real-world application and the
evaluation of such a system is a complex procedure. It requires resources in terms
of machines that run a set of experiments and time that should be devoted to
each experiment setup, run, and analysis. In addition, it is very likely that the
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results of the experiments depend on the particular machine speciﬁcations and en-
vironment settings, such as web server, communication style (for example, Tomcat
and Axis framework, if the system is implemented in Java). Fluctuations, due to
network, memory, CPU, caching, and garbage collection, might appear as well.
All this could reﬂect on the correct analysis of the obtained data and the validity
of the conclusions. Furthermore, such an implementation is based on particular
standards, protocols, and programming languages.
3.2 Repository BasedWeb Services Selection (RB-
WSS)
We propose a technique for dynamic selection of Web Services which will also
handle the problem of redundant Web Services. In this work, we introduce a model
with a Web Service repository, as shown in ﬁgure 3.1 will act as an independent
unit possessing a deﬁnite functionality. This repository will be used to redirect the
client’s request. This will also provide a level of security since it will not be allowed
to invoke directly by the clients. This technique will prevent unauthorized access
to the real services. This provision will also help to hide the systems complexity
from the clients.
The repository will perform three functions namely, storing, collecting and
reasoning. In storing operation a QoS feedback report is generated by the client
and is saved in the repository. The QoS feedback report provides a historical
reference for the consumer to assess the provider. Each provider only keeps the
feedback information relevant to it. The collecting operation retrieves all necessary
data from providers for the reasoning operation. The reasoning operation manages
to select the best service provider for the consumer according to the collected data.
Consider an example where clients needs the services (S1,S2) as in ﬁg.3.1, it sends
a request .The collecting, storing and reasoning mechanism interacts with the web
services to ﬁnd the most appropriate of the services and the results are stored in
the repository for future reference. Web Services here interacts with the reasoning
mechanism to ﬁnd out the appropriate services. Once the service is selected, the
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Figure 3.1: Repository based Web Service Selection
request is forwarded to it. Finally, when the result is generated, it is passed to
the repository which sends it back to the client.
3.2.1 Algorithm: Selection of Service
This algorithm shows the necessary steps to choose a service and get the maximum
quality results.
1. For ﬁnding a service for a speciﬁed task, perform a search on service descrip-
tions.
2. Arrange all discovered services by their signature parameter and discard all
other services.
3. Get the desired Service Parameters.
4. Collect the services result and order by their utility.
5. If no results are found, let the client reconsider the constraints, go to step 2.
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Figure 3.2: Selection Process
This algorithm provides an approach for selecting a speciﬁed service. Services, not
matching the proﬁle are discarded on the ﬂy .It also helps in taking an alternative
services.
3.2.2 Design of the Proposed Architecture
This section provides an overview of the design of the simulation model that is used
to evaluate the RBWSS(Repository Based Web Services Selection) approach. The
architecture, proposed here consists of three main components - Clients, Reposi-
tory Layer, and Web Services, forming the key compound objects of the high-level
view of the simulation design. Object LG (load generator) generates clients’ re-
quests (entities); object represents the behavior of the model, and each object WS
corresponds to a Web Service. Object LS (load sink) is used as the end point of
the entity ﬂow. It accepts the incoming from the RBWSS entities and disposes of
them.
The simulation design of the model is presented in ﬁgure 3.4. Component
Manager is not included, since the settings of the reasoning mechanism are deﬁned
before the simulation runs. There is a Virtual Web Service corresponding to
each group of redundant services with particular functionality. The reasoning
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mechanism is presented by a queue and a server.
3.2.3 AnyLogic Enterprise Library
AnyLogic provides libraries for simulating systems in various domains. The enter-
prise Library can be applied in discrete systems, such as manufacturing, services,
business processes, etc. [13]. It is able to ”create ﬂexible models, collect basic and
advanced statistics, and eﬀectively visualize the process”, in order to represent the
system. At the same time, it ”provides a higher-level interface for fast creation of
discrete event models in the style of ﬂowcharts”, using objects like source, sink,
queue, and delay server, and others, in a drag-and-drop manner [14] .Entity is a
basic concept in the Enterprise Library. The entities represent individual units
that are evaluated in the simulation. They can enter and leave objects through one
directional port. The connections between the ports are established by connectors.
3.2.4 Evaluation
This section describes the evaluation of the proposed Repository Based Web Ser-
vice Selection (RBWSS) approach. Firstly, a feasibility check is done to determine
whether it is possible to build such architecture. Secondly, the behavior of the Web
Services is observed and analyzed in diﬀerent environments. Finally, to observe
the behavior of the prototype with diﬀerent selection techniques, the simulation
method is used, since the study of the optimal strategies is diﬃcult in a real
environment where there are many uncontrollable parameters.
Figure 3.3: Load Generator
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Figure 3.4: Selection Process
The evaluation process carried out by analyzing the RBWSS prototype in or-
der to test whether or not the architecture is a feasible technique for managing
redundant Web Services on the server side in a dynamic and transparent manner.
A simpliﬁed prototype of the proposed architecture is developed, in order to ob-
serve if the model is an applicable approach for dynamic selection of redundant
Web Services. The dynamic service selection is realized by reﬂection that allows
us to obtain information at run-time about methods, constructors, and instance
ﬁelds of classes, as well as to invoke them dynamically [15], [16].
The reasoning mechanism is based on a random selection technique that does
not require any information about the services. Since the decision is done in a
random manner, there is no need for selection criteria, neither the data about
the services must be collected and aggregated by the model. The model of the
reasoning mechanism contains only the WSDL descriptions of the redundant Web
Services.
3.3 Results
The results of the developed framework are as follows:
• The model has a feasible technique for dynamic service selection on the server
side. The layer is able to manage the redundant services in a transparent
manner. All the necessary information, which should be available to the
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Processed Requests by the Web Services
Total
Request
Pro-
cessed
Execution
Time (in
Millisec-
onds)
WS1 WS2 WS3 WS4
60 72.5 15 15 15 15
120 144.5 30 30 30 30
60 100.5 10 18 15 17
120 158.5 20 36 30 34
Table 3.1: Simulation results
client, is the service description (WSDL) of the Web Services. The model
hides the reasoning details during the decision-making process. From the
consumer’s point of view, the prototype is the real Web Service that handles
the request.
• The scalability of the system that implements the described layer is expected
to be the same as the scalability of a system that does not consist of redun-
dant components. The decentralization of the Web Services assures that
there is no single point of control and respectively of failure. There is a
separate component that represents and manages each group of services and
does not inﬂuence the proper work of the whole system.
• The architecture can be used as a layer that assures a level of security. The
Web Services are called by the virtual layer and are never invoked directly
by the clients. This technique can prevent unauthorized users from having
access to the real services.
• It is possible for the response time of the proposed architecture to increase
due to the reasoning mechanism. This is an expected result since the deci-
sion is taken at run-time. Furthermore, it implies a trade-oﬀ between the
appropriate service selection and the execution time of the system.
The obtained data shows that the execution times of the simulation runs are
higher for the load balancing technique compared to the fastest service selection
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but lower compared to the random selection technique. In terms of Web Services
overloading, both the fastest and the load balancing techniques present similar
results.
3.4 Conclusion
We propose an approach for dynamic service selection and, which has the following
advantages in comparison with previous approaches:
• It hides the system’s complexity from the clients.
• It provides a transparent service selection from the client’s point of view.
• It assures a level of security, since the clients do not have direct access to
the Web Services.
In future, other technology that can be applied in the Repository based system is
Semantic Web technology. By describing the data in a machine-understandable
manner and creating semantics of QoS criteria, the decision-making process would
be based on more features as well as their relationships would be represented in a
better and more ﬂexible way. This chapter also describes the simulation environ-
ment AnyLogic and presents the design of the simulation that corresponds to the
proposed Virtual Web Services Layer architecture. The clients are represented by
object Load Generator; the behavior of the model is simulated by object RBWSS;
and the Web Services are represented by objects WS.
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SOAP Level Security:
Implementation and Analysis
The preliminary security papers by Microsoft and IBM [17] proposes various ar-
chitectures for deploying a security service or token service which provides the
necessary tokens in the network of Web Services to manage access and authen-
tication. In the architecture shown in ﬁgure 4.1.Each web service in the system
have a public and a private key. Of course, the private key is kept secret. The
public key of each web service is stored in the Security web service. Also, every
web service that provides a service to others has a list of the public keys of the web
services that have access to it. Whenever the list of a web service in the Security
web service is updated by the administrator, the SWS contacts the web service by
establishing a session with it and updates its list. This is done by encoding the
latest list inside the body of the SOAP envelope.
The web services that make requests to other web services do not contact the
Security Web Service (SWS). This architecture has been chosen for scalability and
availability reasons: when a lot of web services in the network need to communicate
with each other, the SWS may be coded with requests for security tokens. In this
architecture, the web services only need to be updated when something changes
in the setup of the web services or in the way they communicate with each other.
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Figure 4.1: Architecture of Web Service Setup
4.1 Setting Up The Session
The latest version of SOAP [7] version 1.2, the working draft from the W3C, does
not have a notion of a session context, or a security context for that matter. This
means that each and every SOAP message must have an elaborate < Security
> element to address all the security issues at the message level. The problem
of making SOAP messaging conﬁdential between two computer systems can be
addressed by Transport Level Security (TLS) for example Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL). SSL appends Message Authentication Codes (MAC’s) to the transmitted
messages to ensure message integrity, which would preserve the integrity of the
SOAP messages transmitted with SSL as well [18].
However, when various intermediaries or adversaries have to read the SOAP
message [19] to determine who’s next in the communication chain, message in-
tegrity and conﬁdentiality must be preserved. SSL does not provide for non-
repudiation to start with. You only have hop-to-hop security when you are using
SSL to encrypt communications instead of end-to-end security; because it is pos-
sible that security has been breached on one of the web services along the way.
Also, the idea behind SOAP messaging is to provide loosely coupled systems with
a way that they can communicate with each other in a connectionless way.
For example, there could be a message queue that a receiver has to process
ﬁrst. This way the sender of a message must wait for the receiver to ﬁnish the
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queue; here SSL is not a good solution to this problem.
The following code here elaborates the how the response message is sent for
setting up a session.
Figure 4.2: Setting up the Session
Now it is clear how the SOAP messages are constructed, the entire session
is a sequence of three SOAP messages sent back and forth. The purpose of this
session is to ensure that the two web services are indeed communicating with each
other and that no adversary can compromise security. The following diagram is a
schematic representation of the SOAP messages that are exchanged between web
services and it illustrate which SOAP messages are sent and in which order. The
session protocol initiates the session as shown in ﬁgure 4.2.between Web Services
α and β . After a complete run of this protocol, both and agree upon the session
id and they know how many messages each web service has sent (now and in
the future). Using this session setup they can call each other’s operations and
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exchange information securely, meaning no adversary can come in between them,
at least in theory. In practice there might always be implementation errors or
other factors involved that can compromise security. Any web service can end a
session by sending a SOAP envelope back in which a < SessionEnd > element is
the last element of the < Continue > element.
If the Serving Web Service (sws) agreed upon the security methods, it generates
a session key to be used with a symmetric cipher (for example 3DES or AES) and
encrypts this session key using the public key of the Client Web Service (cws) .
This encrypted key is added to the subelement <Encryption > of the < Continue
> element, inside the < EncryptedKey >element which is speciﬁed in [20] . The
ﬁrst element of the < Continue > element is the identity of the sws. The second
element is the < Nonce > element as explained before, followed by the < Session
> element and the < Nr > elements. The < Encryption > element contains the
session key which the sws used to encrypt the body of the SOAP envelope. The
session key is put in a < EncryptedKey > element with an ”Id” attribute linking
the session key to the session.
This works as follows: the cws ﬁrst sends a SOAP message with a digital
signature. The < Continue > element contains a < Nonce > element and empty
< Session > and < Nr > elements. In this case another element, the < Encryption
> element, is added that indicates it wants to communicate with encrypted content
and to establish a session key. Upon receiving this SOAP message, the serving web
service ( sws ) determines if it agrees with the way communication will take place.
It determines if it agrees using the same canonicalization method, the signature
method, the transform algorithm and the digest method. If it does, it remembers
these methods and adopts them. If the sws do not agree on these methods, it
sends a SOAP message back using its own preferences. For simplicity reasons, the
cws must then conform to the preferences set by the sws, otherwise the session is
aborted. The session key is encoded and sent back to the cws.
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Figure 4.3: Establishing SOAP session
4.2 Analysis of SOAP session
There is always been a possibility that due to ﬂaws in the security protocols an
intruder can attack it.
Msg α 1 A B : Header , { Body , Continue , Nonce , Session , Nr α (1),
Encryption} Signed {PrivateKey α}
Msg β 1 A B : Header , { Body , Continue , Nonce , Session (γ) , Nr β (1),Nr
β (1),{SessionKey γ } PublicKey α} Signed PrivateKey β
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Msg α 2 A B : Header ,{ Body ,Continue ,{Operation}SessionKeyγ , Continue
, Nr α (2). Session(γ)} Signed PrivateKey α
The purpose of the session protocol as explained in previous sections is to au-
thenticate two web services to each other and to establish a shared secret session
key with which they can encrypt their messages to ensure conﬁdentiality. The
validity of the protocols can be veriﬁed using Casper [21] , which is a compiler
for analysis of security protocols. The security model can be made using Casper
and this will be helpful in verifying it. Casper converts the modeled protocol into
CSP [22] and FDR [23] is used as a model checker for CSP which in turn is helpful
in verifying the security properties. These security properties can be statements
such as ”authenticated correctly” or ”shared session key is secret”. If there is a
reachable state (while executing the protocol) where such a statement is not true,
FDR will ﬁnd a trace. If there is a trace, then there is an attack upon on the
protocol. The setup of a session can be modeled as follows. This ﬁrst example
was the ﬁrst attempt of ﬁnding a working protocol. After modeling it in Casper,
the resulting Casper script is below
Msg α 1 A  I : Header , { Body , Continue , Nonce , Encryption} Signed Pri-
vateKey α
Msg α 1 IA  B : Header , { Body , Continue , Nonce , Encryption} Signed
PrivateKey α
Msg β 1 B  IA : Header , { Body , Continue , Nonce , Session (γ), Nrβ(1)
{SessionKey γ} PublicKey α } Signed PrivateKey β
Msg β 1 I A : Header , { Body , Continue , Nonce , Session (γ), Nrβ(1)
{SessionKey γ} PublicKey α } Signed PrivateKey β
Msg α 2 A  I : Header , { Body , {Operation} SessionKey γ , Continue,
Session(γ)} Signed PrivateKey α
Msg α 2 IA B : Header, {Body, {Operation} SessionKey γ , Continue, Session(γ)}
Signed PrivateKey α
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The assertions that had to be veriﬁed were, whether or not web service and
were correctly authenticated to each other and whether or not they agreed upon
the session id and the session key. The session key also had to be a shared secret
between the two web services. Unfortunately, running the protocol through Casper
resulted in an attack upon the protocol itself, where the intruder acts as if it was
alpha. This is a very common attack to a security protocol. The following trace
consists of three actors where ”I” stands for the intruder and the subscript to the
intruder means that it is posing as another actor.
The trace found by Casper means that after a complete run of the proto-
col,thinks it has established a session with the intruder, however the intruder
establishes a session with and thinks it has established a session with .This was
just one trace that Casper found during the design of a session. After thorough
analysis of the protocol, the correct deﬁnition of the protocol in Casper is
Msg α 1 : A B : Header , { Body , Continue , Nonce , Session , Nr α (1),
Encryption} Signed {PrivateKey α}
Msg β 1 A B : Header , { Body , Continue ,B, Nonce , Session (γ) , Nr β (1),
Nr β (1),{SessionKey γ } PublicKey α} Signed PrivateKey β
Msg α 2 A  B : Header , { Body , Continue , {Operation} SessionKey γ , Con-
tinue , Nr α (2) Session(γ)} Signed PrivateKey α
Casper did not ﬁnd an attack to this protocol. The diﬀerence here is that can
determine the identity of, because in the message is receives back from either or the
intruder, it is stated that the identity of the sender of the second message must be
. The question is though whether or not this is a good representation of a session
setup with SOAP. It must be certain that all properties of the SOAP session are
modeled in Casper. This means that every aspect of SOAP, relevant to the session
setup, must be modeled in Casper. For instance, the fact that headers may always
be removed by intermediaries may inﬂuence the level of security achieved. It is
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the task of the application to make sure that digital signatures are always veriﬁed
and abnormalities dealt with.
4.3 Web Services Development Kit (WSDK)
WSDK exposes two programming models, Low-level API for direct access, higher-
level integration with ASP.NET, exposed through ASMX. WSDK currently sup-
ports WS-Security, WS-Routing, WS-Referral, DIME, andWS-Attachments .WSDK
currently does not support WS-Inspection, WS-Coordination, or WS-Transaction.
Figure 4.4: WSDK Process Model
The WSDK [24] is an engine for applying advanced Web service protocols to
SOAP messages. This entails writing headers to outbound SOAP messages and
reading headers from inbound SOAP messages. It may also require transforming
the SOAP message body; for instance, encrypting an outbound message’s body
and decrypting an inbound message’s body, as deﬁned by the WS-Security speciﬁ-
cation. This functionality is encapsulated by two sets of ﬁlters: one for outbound
messages and one for inbound messages.
All messages leaving a process request messages from a client or response mes-
sages from server are processed using the outbound message ﬁlters. All messages
arriving in a process request messages to a server or response messages to a client
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are processed using the inbound message ﬁlters. SOAP messages are processed as
they cross application boundaries utilizing a pipeline of ﬁlters.
Filters are responsible for processing SOAP headers. WSDK has the ability
to help secure XML Web services across platforms and trust domains, including
digital signing and encryption of SOAP messages that are compliant with the WS-
Security speciﬁcation. It has the ability to route an XML Web service through
intermediaries using the WS-Routing speciﬁcation, which describes how to place
message addresses in the SOAP message header and enables SOAP messages to
travel serially to multiple destinations along a message path. The route a SOAP
message takes to an XML Web service can be transparently delegated among Web
servers. The core features included in the technology preview of the Microsoft
WSDK include:
1. The ability to help secure XML Web services across platforms and trust
domains, including digital signing and encryption of SOAP messages those
are compliant with the WS-Security speciﬁcation;
2. The ability to route an XML Web service through intermediaries using the
WS-Routing speciﬁcation;
3. Communication between XML Web services can contain attachments that
are not serialized into XML.
4.4 Performance Analysis
The aim here is to ﬁnd out how performance is aﬀected by introducing cryptog-
raphy in SOAP messages. We conducted the experiments on a low performance
host. This was the case because generally the servers or hosts of Web Services
are targets of many requests. We calculated the response times before introducing
cryptography into SOAP messages. SOAP payload may be XML document or
any other content such as image, audio or video data.
The ﬁrst part contains a SOAP message which includes the Header block cre-
ated by the Message Handler. The second and subsequent parts contain payload(s)
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Figure 4.5: SOAP envelope and payload
which may be XML documents or any other content type such as image, audio or
video data. The SOAP manifest header can contain elements that reference the
separate parts using their content identiﬁers. This may be achieved using XLink
references as shown in the following example. The XLink role attribute may be
used to further qualify the type of data contained within the payload [25].
The results obtained after encapsulating cryptographic techniques with the
SOAP messages and without cryptographic techniques are shown in table 4.1 and
4.2
Payload (in
KB)
Response
time
(in Millisec-
onds)
0 0
1 380
78 410
156 580
312 700
Table 4.1: SOAP Analysis without Encryption
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Payload (in
KB)
Response
time
(in Millisec-
onds)
0 0
1 450
78 550
156 700
312 930
Table 4.2: SOAP Analysis with Encryption
The graph plotted shows the behavior of response time as the Payload of SOAP
body increases after encapsulating cryptographic techniques.
Figure 4.6: Response time v/s Payload-I
The test conducted includes a client encrypting the SOAP message with a
symmetric algorithm (Triple DES). The service at the other end would decrypt
the message using the same key. To have the same key at both sides for experiment,
we are inputting the same number of key bytes at both sides for the generation of
the key. Once the message is decrypted, the service performs the operation and
then encrypts the response with the same key. The client decrypts the message
and uses the response.
The analysis was conducted using Microsoft’s WSDK (Web Services Devel-
opment Kit) preview kit. The response time is measured in milliseconds. The
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Figure 4.7: Response time v/s Payload-II
sequence of operations performed at the client side is depicted in the following
ﬁgure. As we have seen from the graphs, the time taken for the asymmetric cryp-
tography is very high aﬀecting the overall performance. Here we can use both
symmetric key cryptography and Asymmetric Key cryptography. The approach
mentioned i.e. signing of the whole SOAP body message is of no use as this would
be very much similar to having an SSL connection. As the previous sections dealt
with problems in SSL, this mechanism of signing has the same problems.
We need to be able to encrypt parts of SOAP body. This is well documented
in the standards of XML encryption. By observing the Graphs 1 and 2, we can
conclude that there is little overhead in the response time using symmetric key
cryptography. So we can asymmetrically encrypt a secret key, which was used to
partially encrypt and send it to the other party in the tag <Encrypted Key>.The
other party would decrypt the encrypted key and start decrypting the parts of
messages encrypted using this key. Interestingly the overhead would be very little.
Assuming that asymmetric algorithm RSA is used, the key size is 1024 bits which
is equivalent to 1KB. The time for encryption and decryption on a heavily loaded
server would be approximately equal to 45 seconds. Also the parsing time could
aﬀect the performance. But almost every day we are getting faster parsers. So
this should not be a problem.
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4.5 Conclusion
It is not uncommon for the security protocols to have ﬂaws so that an intruder
can attack it. The purpose of the session protocol as explained in this chapter is
to authenticate two web services to each other and to establish a shared secret
session key with which they can encrypt their messages to ensure conﬁdentiality.
Web Services require end-to-end security since the requests might have to tra-
verse over a chain of entities. The most popular protocol now in use, SSL, works
well for point-to-point security services. SSL does not completely address the se-
curity issues of Web Services. By itself, WS-Security does not ensure security nor
does it provide a complete security solution. WS-Security is a building block that
is used in conjunction with other Web service speciﬁc protocols which include,
XML encryption, XML signatures etc. to accommodate a wide variety of security
models and encryption technologies to address the security concerns.
Partial encryption, signing and super encryption are a few of the proposed
techniques which could be used to ensure end-to-end security. But the discussed
techniques come with an overhead which is due to parsing large SOAP documents,
among other things. As there are not many standard implementations for these
protocols it is diﬃcult to estimate the overhead. So the eﬀect of these techniques
on performance of Web Services transactions could not be assessed. Unless Web
Services can be made can be made to work with reasonable response time, it is
diﬃcult to see them together solving the problem.
The communication between the service requestor and provider is not very hard
to setup, but while using extensions to SOAP, it show that the implementations
of the extensions is diﬃcult. While building a network of secure web services that
used the proposed security extensions is also hard. However, it was possible to
implement the setup of SOAP session as explained in this chapter.
Digitally signing and encrypting SOAP elements consume resources. The main
idea behind SOAP messaging is to provide a loosely coupled system with a way
that they can communicate with each other in a connectionless way. We have
addressed to the security issues that became relevant during the design of the
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system and at the time of setting up the SOAP session. The research involved
the analysis of available standards and ways to use and develop them to create
such a session by only using parts of those standards. The analysis of the session
setup process proves that an adversary cannot break the protocol by interception,
alteration or by resending of messages.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Work
5.1 Conclusion
The ﬁrst part of the research focuses on the communication between the service
requestor and the service provider. Here we proposed a model for the dynamic
selection of the web services which will facilitate the clients with the more appro-
priate solution in selecting the Web Services. The evaluation of the repository
based prototype shows that such architecture can be built using a set of standard
programming languages and protocols. However, in order to avoid ﬂuctuations of
the experimental results due to particular machine speciﬁcations, programming
languages, and protocols, as well as to observe a large range of system parame-
ters, the layer can be evaluated using an existing simulation tool. The accuracy
of the predicted QoS criteria has a big impact on the selected Web Service. The
repository helps improve the dependability of the system when a low level of Web
Services availability is observed.
The second part of the research involved a thorough analysis of SOAP and the
way it binds to the transport layer protocols. An important part of the research
was to analyse SOAP and to setup a secure SOAP session. This can be done by
using the proposed security extensions to SOAP. The research involved the analysis
of the standards and ways to use and develop them to create such a session, by
using the parts of those standards. The result of the research is a deﬁnition of a
security protocol that has been analyzed using WSDK. More information on how a
security context can be setup is reﬂected in this work. The analysis of the session
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setup proves that an adversary cannot break the protocol by the interception,
alteration or the (re-)sending of messages.
However, implementation faults and the in-security of the servers running the
web services, faults in the security considerations of each speciﬁcation or the level
of security might be compromised. Furthermore, security is most of all a social
problem as well as a technical one.
5.2 Future Work
Firstly, there is still some more implementation work to be done. As explained,
there are parts of the design document that have not been implemented. There
are also beta versions or newer implementations of for example the SOAP D-Sig
speciﬁcation that are improvements upon the already implemented one.
Furthermore, there are a lot of speciﬁcations still under development that add
extensions to SOAP and try to tackle the security issues mentioned in this thesis
from another way. There is a lot of work to be done still in the area of securing
web services and it might be very well possible that there are already speciﬁcations
under development that try to setup a SOAP session and try to achieve message
level security with web services. The stated solution in this thesis is just one of
the ways to do this.
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